A zero-knowledge gadget for spam prevention in anonymous environments. In an application where users are anonymous, nothing stops one user from sending unlimited messages, and nobody can be removed because nobody can be identified. RLN lets a member prove, in zero knowledge, that they belong to a registered group and are within a rate limit; if they exceed it, the extra proof reveals enough of their secret (through Shamir's Secret Sharing) for others to recover it and remove them, optionally taking a stake. It works in three phases: registration, interaction and withdrawal or slashing. It is described as part of Privacy & Scaling Explorations (PSE), a team supported by the Ethereum Foundation, and implementations are used as the spam-protection layer for messaging protocols .
LicenciaPermissive: zerokit is Apache-2.0; the RLN organisation's circuits and contracts carry licences per repository, and the V3 repository states none. https://github.com/Rate-Limiting-Nullifier; https://github.com/vacp2p/zerokit
Estado de Desarrollo 🔬 Beta
PropietarioPrivacy & Scaling Explorations (PSE), a team supported by the Ethereum Foundation; related implementation work (zerokit) is published by Vac, the research group behind Waku
Órgano de GobiernoPrivacy & Scaling Explorations (PSE) team, supported by the Ethereum Foundation; no formal governance body is described
País Not stated by the project.
Año de Inicio 2022
StackCircom, halo2 and Noir circuits (separate repositories in the RLN organisation); Poseidon hashing for identity commitments; Shamir's Secret Sharing; Solidity registry contract; Rust (zerokit), JavaScript (rlnjs) and CLI tooling
FinanciamientoSupported by the Ethereum Foundation through the PSE team
Financiamiento - Lista
Ethereum Foundation
Última Investigación 29 oct 2026
Vista de topología
Esta herramienta en el centro y lo que se relaciona directamente con ella. Cada línea nombra el tipo de relación.
OrígenesSpam and sybil resistance for anonymous messaging and voting without revealing identity: replace identity-based moderation with a cryptographic rate limit enforced by the threat of exposure and slashing
Base de Datos N/A
Lenguaje de Consulta N/A
Formatos de DatosIdentity commitments in a Merkle tree; zero-knowledge proofs with public outputs including a nullifier and a Shamir share; Solidity registry contract interface
Soporte MóvilLibrary-level: Rust (zerokit) can be embedded in native and mobile applications; no application
Soporte WebLibrary-level: JavaScript libraries (rlnjs) and WebAssembly builds
Aplicaciones NativasLibrary-level only
TérminosFree and open source; individual repositories carry their own licences
Financiamiento - Lista
Ethereum Foundation
Fondos Not stated by the project.
Basado EnSemaphore-style anonymous group membership (V3 is built on Semaphore V4 features), Shamir's Secret Sharing and zero-knowledge proofs
PermisosRegistry rules decide who may register; the rate limit decides how often each member may act
Autenticación e IdentidadMembers register an identity commitment (the Poseidon hash of a secret key) and prove membership in zero knowledge; no real-world identity is involved
Modelo de AlmacenamientoA registry (an on-chain contract or application-managed tree) holds identity commitments; proofs are carried in the application's messages
InteroperabilidadA gadget that applications and messaging protocols integrate; the documentation lists a smart-contract design, circuits in several proving systems and implementations in Rust, JavaScript and CLI form
Portabilidad de DatosIdentities and proofs depend on the registry the application uses; they are not portable between applications by default
Gobernanza y Toma de DecisionesSpecification and implementations are developed in the open by the PSE team and contributors; no decision process is described
Madurez del Protocolo / EstandarizaciónA formal specification exists in the RLN documentation, with version 3 in development; no standards-body involvement; many repositories inactive since 2023-2024
Estándares de IdentidadNo W3C DID or Verifiable Credentials mapping
Métodos DID Soportados N/A
Gestión de ClavesEach member holds a secret key; exceeding the rate limit exposes it by design, after which it can be used to slash the member's stake
Tipos de CredencialesAnonymous membership proofs with a rate-limit nullifier; not credentials issued by a third party
Método de VerificaciónA verifier checks the zero-knowledge proof against the registry's Merkle root, checks the nullifier for reuse within the epoch, and can recover the secret if two messages share an epoch
Funciones de PrivacidadAnonymous membership and unlinkable messages within the limit; exceeding the limit deliberately reveals the member's secret
Métodos de AutenticaciónZero-knowledge proof of registered membership attached to each message
Mecanismo de RevocaciónSlashing: anyone who recovers a spammer's secret can remove the member from the registry and, where a stake is used, claim it; withdrawal is voluntary exit
Tipos de Agentes SoportadosIndividual anonymous users of applications that integrate it
Tipos de Billetera/ClienteLibraries (Rust, JavaScript) and CLI tooling; no wallet
Mecanismos de Recuperación Not stated by the project.
Cumplimiento / Regulaciones Not stated by the project.
Protocolos de Intercambio de CredencialesNone: proofs are attached to the application's own messages
Marco de ConfianzaCryptographic proofs against a registry root, with economic slashing as deterrent; trust in the registry's admission rules
Modelo de CostosFree to use; registration may require a stake and on-chain registration fees depending on the deployment
Resistencia a la CensuraModerate: anyone can verify proofs, but registry control determines who may participate
Relaciones
Cómo se conecta esta herramienta con otras herramientas y organizaciones, según relaciones revisadas por el responsable de datos de OpenHaven. Describen cómo se conectan los proyectos, no su calidad.