Threshold-based flow funding

Prototype / conceptual Game position: Modify Accumulation: Penalizes Ethical frame: Smithian-Rousseauian Divisibility: Fine Uniformity: Fungible

Prototype: Simulation only — no deployed prototype (proposed: DAO contributor compensation, OSS funding, research-collective allocation, community grant programs)

Guarantees each participant a sustainable funding floor and caps individual maximums, then recursively redistributes overflow according to each participant's own allocation preferences.

Structural profile

Topology view

Architecture

Game position
Modifies the public-goods allocation layer; adds minimum-viability floors and maximum-capacity ceilings absent from quadratic funding
Value-signal richness
Single matching-fund unit; distribution follows minimum-then-proportional-then-capped allocation logic
Accumulation regime
Enables accumulation up to a maximum threshold; overflow beyond the cap is recursively redistributed, penalizing concentration

Medium-of-Exchange Properties

Divisibility
The funding unit is finely divisible, following the minimum-then-proportional-then-capped allocation logic.
Uniformity (Fungibility)
Fungible — each unit of redistributed overflow is interchangeable.
Durability
Not applicable — simulation-only allocation logic, no durable token or store of value involved.
Portability
Not applicable — the mechanism redistributes overflow between participants, it doesn't create a portable medium.
Acceptability
Not applicable — no deployed prototype exists yet, so real-world acceptability can't be assessed.

Operation

Coordination / discovery
Algorithmic threshold enforcement plus participant-directed recursive redistribution of overflow
Governance & issuance
Protocol-defined thresholds; participants set individual allocation preferences that shape the redistribution flow
Scale & federation
Tested in simulation from 10 to 1000+ accounts; designed for DAOs and decentralized communities rather than a fixed geography

Anthropological assumptions

Default ethical orientation
Smithian-Rousseauian; balances individual sustainability guarantees with collective, preference-driven redistribution.
Accumulative drive
Drive bounded by the maximum threshold; recursive overflow redistribution channels excess rather than letting it concentrate
Status / recognition
Partially separated; minimum thresholds guarantee sustainability independent of accumulated status
Time preference
Long — the source design treats long-term sustainability as co-equal with allocation efficiency, a stated orientation the axis credits directly.

In Practice

Track record
Simulation only — no deployed prototype exists yet, so there is no real-world track record to report (proposed applications: DAO contributor compensation, OSS funding, research-collective allocation, community grant programs).
Governance requirements
Would require a funding body to set the minimum/cap thresholds and administer the redistribution logic — not yet tested against a real governance process.
Resource requirements
Would require a funding pool and a platform implementing the threshold-based allocation logic; neither has been built at production scale yet.