Threshold-based flow funding
Prototype / conceptual Game position: Modify Accumulation: Penalizes Ethical frame: Smithian-Rousseauian Divisibility: Fine Uniformity: Fungible
Prototype: Simulation only — no deployed prototype (proposed: DAO contributor compensation, OSS funding, research-collective allocation, community grant programs)
Guarantees each participant a sustainable funding floor and caps individual maximums, then recursively redistributes overflow according to each participant's own allocation preferences.
Structural profile
Topology view
- Distributed-ledger protocol grammar: Prototype / conceptual · Game: Modify
- Quadratic funding: Established Alternative · Game: Modify
- Bioregional ecological-impact-backed currency: Emerging Alternative · Game: Modify
Architecture
- Game position
- Modifies the public-goods allocation layer; adds minimum-viability floors and maximum-capacity ceilings absent from quadratic funding
- Value-signal richness
- Single matching-fund unit; distribution follows minimum-then-proportional-then-capped allocation logic
- Accumulation regime
- Enables accumulation up to a maximum threshold; overflow beyond the cap is recursively redistributed, penalizing concentration
Medium-of-Exchange Properties
- Divisibility
- The funding unit is finely divisible, following the minimum-then-proportional-then-capped allocation logic.
- Uniformity (Fungibility)
- Fungible — each unit of redistributed overflow is interchangeable.
- Durability
- Not applicable — simulation-only allocation logic, no durable token or store of value involved.
- Portability
- Not applicable — the mechanism redistributes overflow between participants, it doesn't create a portable medium.
- Acceptability
- Not applicable — no deployed prototype exists yet, so real-world acceptability can't be assessed.
Operation
- Coordination / discovery
- Algorithmic threshold enforcement plus participant-directed recursive redistribution of overflow
- Governance & issuance
- Protocol-defined thresholds; participants set individual allocation preferences that shape the redistribution flow
- Scale & federation
- Tested in simulation from 10 to 1000+ accounts; designed for DAOs and decentralized communities rather than a fixed geography
Anthropological assumptions
- Default ethical orientation
- Smithian-Rousseauian; balances individual sustainability guarantees with collective, preference-driven redistribution.
- Accumulative drive
- Drive bounded by the maximum threshold; recursive overflow redistribution channels excess rather than letting it concentrate
- Status / recognition
- Partially separated; minimum thresholds guarantee sustainability independent of accumulated status
- Time preference
- Long — the source design treats long-term sustainability as co-equal with allocation efficiency, a stated orientation the axis credits directly.
In Practice
- Track record
-
Simulation only — no deployed prototype exists yet, so there is no real-world track record to report (proposed applications: DAO contributor compensation, OSS funding, research-collective allocation, community grant programs). - Governance requirements
- Would require a funding body to set the minimum/cap thresholds and administer the redistribution logic — not yet tested against a real governance process.
- Resource requirements
- Would require a funding pool and a platform implementing the threshold-based allocation logic; neither has been built at production scale yet.